FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION MATTER UNDER REVIEW 5835 DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING

Tuesday, October 28, 2008

999 E Street, N.W. 9th Floor Meeting Room Washington, D.C.

COMMISSION MEMBERS:

DONALD F. McGAHN II, Chairman

STEVEN T. WALTHER, Vice-Chairman

CYNTHIA L. BAUERLY, Commissioner

MATTHEW S. PETERSEN, Commissioner

ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB, Commissioner

CAROLINE C. HUNTER, Commissioner


ALSO PRESENT:

THOMASENIA P. DUNCAN, General Counsel

JOSEPH STOLTZ, Acting Staff Director

PRESENTING ATTORNEY:

BRIAN SVOBODA, ESQUIRE



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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: We're here for a probable cause hearing on MUR 5385 regarding the DCCC. That's short for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. Before we begin, I'd like to give a little overview of the procedures, so we all know what we're going to do here, because it's still a rather new program and some have come in and been a little unsure, and I want to make sure we know the ground rules.

Under our policy statement, which is a public document, respondents will have 20 minutes for their prepared statement. You may divide this time between an opening statement and a closing statement. We'd like you to inform us how much you want to leave at the end, kind of for rebuttal. We do have the lights -- yellow is five minute warning, red means time's up, but unlike the U.S. Supremes, I don't think we're going to just disappear behind a curtain when you're in mid-sentence.

After you've made your opening statement, I recognize various Commissioners ask questions. My preference is the Commissioners just do it quasi-judicial and not the

sort of rolling comments we do in rulemaking. So if people have questions, fire away. And then once that is done, under our policy statement, general counsel and the staff director may also ask questions upon being recognized by the Chair. And those questions, not surprisingly, are not timelimited. So we can talk as long as we want to talk. And under a policy statement, we have an hour-and-a-half blocked in for this. If it doesn't take that long, then we don't take that long. So we -- if we get through this, we get through this.

To frame-up the issues, the Commission has previously found "Reason to Believe" that an unknown respondent violated 2 U.S.C.441d by allegedly failing to include disclaimers on two sets of phone banks. After an investigation, it was revealed that the DCCC in some form or another paid Quest Global Research, Incorporated, to conduct three sets of what's alleged to be phone banks. Based on that information, the Commission substituted the DCCC and Boswell for Congress in place of the, quote, unknown responded, unquote.

After some time passed, the general counsel on a

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brief dated July 1, 2008, recommended that the Commission find probable cause to believe that the DCCC violated 2 U.S.C.441d by failing to include disclaimers in its supposed telephone banks. Respondents submitted a reply brief on August 11, 2008, and requested a hearing, which was granted on August 20th and here we are. That's where we are, so take it away.

MR. SVOBODA: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you members of the Commission. I'm Brian Svoboda from

Perkins Coie and I'm here with my colleague Kate Cain, an

associate in our firm.

I thank you first for giving me the opportunity to be here without interruption by cell or by Blackberry a week before the election, which is an unwelcome -- or an unusual treat. And I'm also grateful to be here, because the issue before the Commission today is a very important issue. The Commission is being asked to find for the first time that a bona fide scientific public opinion research poll is subject to the disclaimer requirements of the act. Without having provided specific notice or comment toward that conclusion without having giving any real inkling in its public

materials or its other pronouncements that this is indeed the case. And we would respectfully submit to the Commission that it should not find that both441d or 110.11 applies to a bona fide scientific poll. The statute and the regulations on their face govern only advertising, and a poll by definition is not a form of advertising, it is designed and used to elicit information, not to disseminate information. It is not the sort of communication that Congress intended to cover with441d and indeed that the statute is supposed to cover. And for these reasons, and also for the consequences that a finding would have for the entire regulated political community, we would ask the Commission not to find probable cause in this matter.

Now, I talk about bona fide scientific research polls and an obvious question that may occur to you is what exactly does that mean, so let me talk a moment about the polls in this matter and how they relate to the other types of communications that political organizations sponsor. Political committees, and parties, and candidates communicate in a number of different ways by phone. From time to time, they'll do what people in the industry would

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call persuasion calls and these are messages being sent to voters to try to influence their voting behavior. They tend to be sent in mass quantities to influence a significant number of people at a relatively low cost. From time to time, parties and candidates will do what's called ID calls. You're collecting individualized personal information from voters about their preferences, so that you can put it into a database and use it later to mobilize the voting decisions and turn them out on Election Day. There's a lot of that going on this week. I can guarantee you.

What we're talking about here today, and what's at issue in this matter, is something completely separate and apart from these types of communications, we're talking about bona fide scientific public opinion research polls.

These are the sorts of polls that Dick Worthlan did for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984.

These are the sorts of polls that Matthew Dow did for President Bush in 2000 and 2004. These are the sorts of polls that Mark Mellman did for John Kerry in 2004. This is where somebody in the political consulting industry, typically with a social science background in some degree of

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higher education puts together a questionnaire, at least 10 minutes in length, often longer, that is designed to elicit information from a random sampling of voters, not collecting individualized information. They don't have any interest in knowing who these people are, particularly once they've collected the results and used them, for purposes of eliciting information from them and getting, if you will, a snapshot of voter attitudes and voter responses to issues pertaining to the election. To know, for example, who is likely to vote for which candidate, to know, for example, what issues are likely to move which voters, to know, for example, how different issues might resonate with different subgroups of voters.

So you'll put together a questionnaire. You will distribute it over a period of some nights to a sample size that can run anywhere from 300 to 500 -- or upwards of 500 of voters -- and you'll take the information and you'll aggregate it and produce what pollsters call top lines, which are the results showing in basic what was found and also cross-tabular results, which is intended to show how these results vary among different demographic groups or

people who responded in different ways to the poll. And all of this is taken by the campaigns or by the party to influence their strategic decision-making.

They're not trying to influence the voter's behavior on the call, they don't want to influence the voter's behavior on the call. They want to know what the voter genuinely thinks so that they can consider that in their strategic decision-making. So if, for example, they called my wife tonight at home and asked her if she was going to vote for Barack Obama and she told them, No, I'm not going to vote for Barack Obama, they don't want her -- that they want her to tell the truth. They don't want to tell her what she might think they want to hear or to change her answer. They want to know genuinely what they think, so that they can consider it in a statistical analysis of voter behavior.

And so the communication itself is not intended to influence voter behavior, it is used to influence the strategic decision-making that later will influence voter behavior. So that's what a bona fide scientific poll is and that's how it's different from the other types of phone

communications that political committees sponsor. It's the sort of thing that every major presidential campaign, every major Senate campaign, every major House campaign sponsors. They are ubiquitous in the political community and they have been for years, and years, and years.

So how do we know that the polls in this matter fall into this category? I would commend the Commission to look -- or the Commissioners to actually look at the documents that have been produced in the course of this investigation, and if you follow politics closely, you'll see that these polls are exactly what they were. How do we know they were bona fide polls?

First off, they were paid for or they were Commissioned by a reputable democratic opinion research firm, Hans, Looney, List, which provides these sorts of services for democratic candidates across the board.

Second, if you look at the questionnaire, you'll see if falls into this category. It runs upward of 10 minutes in length, it seeks demographic information, it seeks information, for example, about head to heads in the presidential race, and it tests voter responses on

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particular issues. You can tell this by the quantity of the calls.

If I wanted, for example, to tell voters in Iowa in 2004 that Stan Thompson had not supported funding to hunt down Osama Bin Laden, which was one of the questions in one of the polls, they were testing an issue to see if it would work well in the campaign. I wouldn't do it in a 10 minute questionnaire to 800 Iowans for which I paid \$10,000.00, I'd do it in a one minute robo-call to 100,000 Iowans for which I could pay \$10,000.00. I would communicate with a much wider universe of people at a much more efficient way and a much cheaper way. And that's where I might recommend that the Commission take a look at the affidavit that we submitted on behalf of Al Quinlan, a democratic pollster, talking about the difference between the bona fide polls that are conducted for survey research purposes and push polls and other types of phone communications. One of the points that Mr. Quinlan makes is that bona fide survey research polls, because of the length of time and the expense, are just not an efficient means to communicate information positive or negative. They're not used that way

and they just don't fit for that sort of purpose.

So those are the polls in this matter. One was commenced on October 12th. It went to a sample size of 550 respondents. It was paid for by the DCCC as a 441d expense on behalf of Leonard Boswell. One was commenced on October 21 and had a sample size of 800 voters and, again, was paid for by the DCCC as a 441AD expense for Boswell.

So the question before the Commission today is, does this type of poll, does this type of communication, require a disclaimer and should it require a disclaimer?

And the answer to that, we would submit, is found in the statute. And the answer to that is no. The statute itself,441d, and the regulation that implements it, 11 CFR 110.11, on their face are limited only to advertising. Only to advertising.

And, in fact, if you look at the legislative history from McCain-Feingold, which most recently amended the statute, and you look at the summary of the legislation, which the sponsors offered, you will see the section, the revised441d, designed as standards of clarity for election-related advertising. And a poll, simply put, is not

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advertising. It's not intended to disseminate information, it's intended to elicit information.

So how did we get to this place? How are we presented here with a proposed finding that, indeed, the poll should have carried a disclaimer? Well, part of the problem is that the Commission's disclaimer regulation, 110.11, borrows the phrase public communication from Section 431(22). And public communication, when Congress enacted that term in BCRA, was written without the disclaimer requirement in mind. It doesn't occur in the disclaimer statute. Congress wrote it to implement the soft money spending provisions that apply to state and local parties and that apply to state and local candidates. So it was trying to capture through that term a wide universe of communications.

They knew, for example, that a state party might run a phone bank urging people to go out to the hot dog feed for candidate X. And if candidate X was a federal candidate, Congress presumably wanted that communication to be paid for with federal money. If it was promoting candidate X. And so there was great importance put by the

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sponsors of BCRA and by Congress on trying to have a definition of public communication that was sufficiently large, that it would not allow parties to evade the soft money spending band.

So the Commission is tasked with writing rules to implement the disclaimer requirement of 441d and it seizes on the definition of public communication as a useful proxy, if you will, to try to identify the sorts of communications that are captured by the disclaimer statute. The definition of public communication has served over the years as kind of like a Swiss Army knife for the Commission, useful in a number of different contexts other than the one in which it was originally written, for example, in the coordination rules or in the allocation rules for non-party pacts. But the problem that you have is that the disclaimer requirement, on its face, is limited solely to advertising, so to simply say that when you communicate with anybody by phone to more than 500 people, that it's advertising, well, you can see how in a matter like this you hit a blind spot where the regulation and the statute don't quite meet. It's rather like having a regulation that leads you to conclude

that all four-legged animals with tails are dogs. Well they're not. I mean there's some that aren't.

And logic leads one to conclude that there are some types of communications that may be distributed by phone and indeed may be distributed by more than 500 people, but at bottom they're not advertising, which is all that the statute regulates.

And so that's how, I think, we got to this place.

And it's important to know as you see this process that

Congress evidenced no intent that the disclaimer

requirements should capture public opinion polls. Believe

me, this is one of the things that members of Congress know

about. If there's anything they know about, it's the polls

that they read and the polls that are conducted on their

behalf. And if you had asked any of them whether a

disclaimer would have to be put on their polls, I think it's

a safe bet that a vast majority of them would have been

aghast. There's nothing in the legislative history to

suggest that that's what Congress intended to do. There's

nothing in the regulatory history, when the Commission wrote

110.11 in 2002, to suggest that the disclaimer requirements

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applied to bona fide public opinion polls. There was some back and forth in the rulemaking as to whether it can apply to phone calls at all.

And there were two comments, one submitted on behalf of the NRCC and one submitted by Perkins Coie suggesting at the time that it was unsafe for the Commission to conclude that it could be. But nonetheless, whether 441d applies to some universe of phone calls or not, there's nothing in the regulatory history to suggest that it was intended to apply to a bona fide scientific poll. And you can search the campaign guides, the brochures, the Commission's other informal guidance, presumably your education training seminars, in vain for anything where the Commission has told the regulated community that a bona fide poll has to have a disclaimer.

So all of this leads one to conclude -- leads us to conclude quite strongly that 441d and 110.11 do not capture this sort of communication, were not intended to capture this sort of communication, and, indeed, can't be applied by the face of the statute to this sort of communication.

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So what happens if the Commission nonetheless does apply it to this sort of communication? What's the consequences of a probable cause finding here? The first consequence -- and this addresses a question that I myself had in the course of lawyering this matter -- is how would it affect the data that political committees collect in order to conduct their business? And the answer is it would -- to be blunt, it would screw up the data. And the reason for that is this. You might very well have a poll with a 10 minute questionnaire and a disclaimer at the end, so when you found out what Svoboda thinks about the presidential race and you tell him at the end it's paid for by McCain-Palin and he can't take it back, he can't change his answers.

So you've got Svoboda's response, but the problem is -- particularly in the age of the Internet -- you may have Svoboda then going and posting to the Daily Coast or to RedState.org saying, hey, I was called by Obama for America and they asked me this or I was called by McCain-Palin and they asked me this, this, and this. They asked me these five embarrassing questions about John McCain, they

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asked me these five embarrassing questions about Barack

Obama. I can't believe they asked me these questions and
that's going to have the effect over a poll that's conducted

over multiple nights, as polls typically are, of screwing up
the subsequent responses.

The people who get the calls the next day or the day after may well have read or be aware that a poll's being conducted, know exactly who is conducting it, and they may have a desire to lie to the pollster, they may, without wanting to lie -- and this is something that Al Quinlan talks about in his affidavit -- be nonetheless affected in how they're providing their answers. They think, for example, they're telling the pollster what they want to hear because they know who the pollster is, they think they're being clever or ingenious in answering the questions, so what you have is a situation where political committees are going to find it much, much harder to reliably collect survey data because of the way information spreads. This is a problem that actually now, with the advent of the Internet, is starting to happen with polling. It is a problem that the Commission would make triply or quadruply

worse by requiring polls to carry a disclaimer.

One last point that I want to make sure that the Commission's aware of is that the sample sizes in this poll were 550 and 800 respondents respectively, according to the general counsel's analysis. So one might be led to believe that because many polls involve smaller sample sizes, sample sizes of 300 or 400 respondents, that this is actually not going to capture the bulk of polls that political committees conduct. And the answer is quite the contrary. As Al Quinlan talks about in his affidavit, you have to call many, many more people than that 550 or 800 people to get a significant number of respondents. And so you're going to live in a world where virtually every poll, that every campaign, and every party conducts is going to be subject to the disclaimer requirement.

So the Commission really is on the verge here of reaching a consequence that -- or reaching an outcome that will have huge consequences for the entire political community and will completely change the way a significant part of American campaigning is conducted, all without benefit of notice and all without benefit of comment.

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And so this is why we would respectfully submit that the Commission should not find probable cause in this matter, that the Commission should find, as the statute says and as the regulation says, that they extend only to advertising and that the polls in this instance, indeed, are not advertising and are not communications that can be covered by the statute or the regulations.

 $\label{eq:commission} \textbf{I} \ \ \textbf{thank the Commission and I welcome your}$ questions.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Thank you. Let me start -first, I don't think there's any issue that these are polls,
probable cause recommendation briefs, first sentence, and
other statement of facts DCCC are to polling and voter
identification company. Anzalone -- Anzalone -- I don't
know if it's Anzalone or Anzalone -- Lists Research and to
conduct two telephone polls in October 2004. So I don't
have any issue that these are actually polls. And I'll have
some questions later about what that means under the regs,
but I'm curious if you can help me understand the procedural
history of this case. There was an RTB finding long before
your client was involved and then, as I understand it, your

client was put in as a respondent post-RTB. Could you help me understand that? Why are you here?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, from the DCCC's perspective, Mr. Chairman, what happened was there was apparently an investigation involving these polls for reasons that haven't been disclosed to the DCCC, that resulted in discovery by the Commission and a conclusion by the general counsel that the DCCC has paid for the polls. And at that point, the Commission found "Reason to Believe" against the DCCC

And this occurred, if memory serves, I believe on December 17 of 2007.

And so at that point, the DCCC, which before then had not been notified of any complaint, had not been given the opportunity to respond to any complaint. The DCCC responded to the RTB finding, we asked the Commission to reconsider the RTB finding, we provided the Commission and the general counsel with a brief explaining why the RTB finding was not reached properly. And then at that point, of course, the Commission was on hiatus and so we heard

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nothing until, I believe, before the full complement of Commissioners had been appointed when the general counsel declared its intention to recommend a finding of probable cause in the matter. And so at that point, we provided the Commission -- I believe this was in August of this year -we provided the Commission with a letter explaining why we disagreed with the probable cause recommendation and providing the Commissioners with a road map, if you will, of what had happened previously -- and also provided two Commissioners a copy of the brief that we had sent in February, so the Commissioners were aware of the legal issues that we had raised in response to the RTB finding. So that, so far as we know, is why we're here. CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Thank you. Just to clarify, you were notified by the counsel that they were going to recommend probable cause, when did that occur? MR. SVOBODA: That was, I believe, in July of this year. July 1. CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Okay. Could you give me a little sense of the history -- more -- I guess broadly telephones -- telephones, the act, and you. The need for

disclaimers, prior rulemaking efforts that's actually in the statute versus the (inaudible) and the rulemaking post VICRA as to how we ended up with a legal theory that polls require disclaimers? Give a history lesson for us. Some of us are new here.

MR. SVOBODA: Sure. The best first way to take a cut at this is to divide the world into pre-BCRA and post-BCRA. Pre-BCRA, the disclaimer statutes applied only to express advocacy communications and only to communications that solicited money. That's what, for example, the survival education fund case was about. And there was dispute among the Commission --

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: That case was about disclaimers?

MR. SVOBODA: Correct.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Thank you.

MR. SVOBODA: Correct. And there was dispute with the Commission over whether the disclaimer statute could apply to phone calls at all. And there was a rulemaking which occurred in the Commission, I believe in the early 1990s, when the Commission deadlocked on the question of whether the disclaimer requirement could be applied to phone

calls at all. So pre-BCRA, the working assumption among the regulated community was that phone calls of whatever stripe, whether it was a poll, whether it was a robo-call, whether it was a persuasion call, whether it was an ID call, did not require a disclaimer. So then Congress passes BCRA in 2002.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Can I just jump in? Was it your sense or -- to the extent you can opine on the sense of the so-called regulated community -- after that deadlocked rulemaking, the law was clear you didn't need disclaimers on phones?

MR. SVOBODA: That's correct. That's the way I would have advised a client at the time and I believe that is correct.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Thank you.

MR. SVOBODA: So Congress passes BCRA in 2002 and it does a number of things. The first is it crafts a definition of public communication and telephone bank for the purpose of implementing the soft money spending restrictions that were placed on state and local parties.

And, indeed, if you look at the legislative history, the section by section analysis that Senator Feingold introduced

for BCRA before its final passage, you'll see that the definitions of public communication and telephone bank are described as being for the purpose of implementing the soft money restrictions. No sense that they had any salience or relevance to the disclaimer requirements, it was all about making sure that the state parties and the local parties and local candidates were spending hard money to affect federal elections.

So you had a definition of public communication, which included so-called telephone banks, which were defined as phone calls reaching more than 500 people during a 30-day period. And here it's important to note phone bank is actually a term of art in the political professional community. That means something different than the sorts of polls that John Anzalone would have conducted or that Matt Dow would have conducted. When a political operative thinks of a phone bank, they think of either hiring a bunch of telemarketers to distribute, you know, an advocacy communication to someone or they think of a campaign getting bunches of fresh-paced volunteers into a room with 30 phones and feeding them pizza while they call voters and try to

identify supporters or people who aren't supporting them. I mean that's what phone bank means in the political world and plainly that's what Congress was thinking of when they wrote McCain-Feingold, because they knew that state and local parties did this sort of thing to support their candidates and they wanted it paid for with hard money, just as they wanted GOTB paid with hard money. So that's what Congress did with public communications and phone banks.

At the same time, Congress amends the disclaimer statute and it clearly broadened the disclaimer statute, because it wanted it to reach beyond express advocacy communications. It wanted it, for example, to cover issue ads, electioneering communications that covered candidates, because, bear in mind, one of the big purposes of McCain-Feingold was to try to take a whole spew of activity that was being conducted outside the campaign finance laws, issue ads being sponsored by parties or issue ads being sponsored by non-party organizations and bring it in and regulate it.

So the disclaimer statute was expanded insofar as it could cover more than express advocacy, more than solicitations, but it still remained tethered to a

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definition of general public political advertising.

Communications still had to be a form of advertising to be subject to the disclaimer requirement.

write regulations to implement the disclaimer requirements. Actually, I'm sorry, it wasn't July, it was somewhat later than that. I believe the rules were published in September or October of 2002. And the Commission, at that point, saw the definition of public communication in the state and local party-funding context and thought and proposed that it might be useful for defining what would be covered by the disclaimer regulation. In other words, it said why don't we just simply say that disclaimers are required for public communications that are paid for by political committees? Viewing public communications as being a useful proxy, if you will, for conducting advertising.

Now, there was a problem with that in terms of statutory analysis. It was a problem that Cooney surfaced in his comments on the rulemaking. It was a problem, also, that the NRCC surfaced in its comments on the rulemaking and the problem was this. If you look at 431(22) and the

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definition of public communication, and you look at 441d, the first talks about telephone banks and the second doesn't. They are otherwise almost exactly the same, but the definition of public communication talks about telephone banks and 441d excludes it.

Now, the Commission passed this in the rulemaking by saying that the statutes were virtually identical, but virtually identical is kind of a nice way of saying they're not exactly the same. And we can't simply assume that Congress screwed up as a matter of law, we have to assume that Congress acted purposefully under standard principles of administrative law and statutory interpretation. And that gave rise to the comment that we made, and the NRCC made, which is that there was danger in treating the statutes as equivalent. And that has not proved to be -that did not prove to be a problem as a practical matter for some period, because the fact of the matter is the bulk of public communications do involve some form of advertising, but it first popped up as a problem in a matter that the Commission took up roughly a year ago involving David Vitter's campaign.

David Vitter ran for Senate in Louisiana in, I believe, 2004 and David Vitter sponsored two sets of calls. One was a universe of 400,000 advocacy calls telling people to vote for him, that his committee had paid for, and they didn't have a disclaimer. The second was what seemed to be roughly 90,000 peer ID calls. A simple script saying who are you going to vote for in the Senate election and collecting individualized information and putting it into the database. And the Commission found on those facts and found probable cause that the Vitter campaign should have included a disclaimer on those calls. And it extracted a conciliation agreement from Vitter where he agreed to settle the matter.

Now, my view of the Vitter matter is that the Commission got it half right and half wrong. On the first universe of calls, the persuasion calls, I see a strong argument that they were a form of advertising under the statute and the regulation. He was communicating with 400,000 people and telling them to vote for him. But on the second universe of calls, the peer ID's, that's a much harder call for the Commission to sustain, had it chose to

enforce against him in court, in my view.

I don't have the benefit of knowing whether the Commission would have proceeded against Vitter were it not for that first universe of calls, but I think there's reason to doubt that they would have or should have. It would have been a difficult conclusion to sustain, I think, in court.

But that leads us to our matter, which is, you know, of a type different from all of this. Where for the first time the Commission's being asked to assume that these requirements apply to actual scientific polls, the types of polls that every committee conducts.

So, Mr. Chairman, I don't know if that's --

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: One follow-up. Are we safe in either assuming or deferring, depending on how you want to view it, to Congress, that they understood the distinctions between phone banks and polls and a flip-side, voter ID versus advocacy calls and that kind of thing? It is kind of the argument that the government made in the McConnell case; right? Defer to Congress, they're the political experts? Wouldn't that argument still have some viability in this case?

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MR. SVOBODA: Well, at bottom, Mr. Chairman, the Commission is responsible for interpreting its own -- first, it's responsible for interpreting the statute and it enjoys some discretion in being able to do that. It's also responsible for interpreting its own rules and it is on its strongest ground when it does that.

So the Commission might reasonably, you know, based on its judgment of the facts and its application of expertise, reach a judgment that a scientific poll is not a, quote, phone bank. It might also similarly reach a judgment that a scientific poll is not a form of advertising under 110.11. Those are the classic sorts of judgments that the Commission, as an agency charged with interpreting the Act and credited with expertise in campaign finance law and its administration, that's the sort of judgment to which a court is more likely to defer.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: But, my point is, if Congress wanted to put disclaimers on polls, they knew what polls were, they could have put that in the statute. But it's not in the statute. The best we have is telephone bank, not in the disclaimer statute, but the definitional section.

Congress knew the difference between a poll and voter ID and advocacy calls and all that kind of thing; right? At least we can assume they did?

MR. SVOBODA: I think that's correct. And if you look also at some of the legislation that has been introduced subsequent to McCain-Feingold, where members of Congress have asked to amend the law expressly to require disclaimers for push polls and automated phone calls, you get a sense, at least among some in Congress, that they don't feel that they've done that. So it's a strong indication and just goes to show that Congress never intended the disclaimer requirement to apply to these types of polls.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Ms. Weintraub?

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Svoboda, for taking time out of what is undoubtedly a very busy week and also for what I think is one of the more informative and cogent presentations we've seen at one of these probable cause hearings. You have no way of knowing how you stand comparative-wise, but take my word on it --

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: You stand tall. 1 COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: You stand tall. 2 MR. SVOBODA: It's not over yet. 3 COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: And while the question 4 I'm really dying to ask you is, is Sheila really going to 5 vote for McCain? But no, no, I'm not really asking that. 6 I'm trying to figure out the scope of your argument here. 7 Is -- are you saying that the regulation on its 8 face doesn't apply to these sorts of communications or 9 shouldn't apply to these sorts of communications? 10 MR. SVOBODA: I'm saying doesn't. 11 COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: Does not? 12 MR. SVOBODA: Because both the regulation and the 13 statute apply only to advertising and a poll like this by 14 definition is not a form of advertising. 15 COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: Okay. So you're not --16 because I was a little bit unclear -- it sounded almost like 17 an argument for opening another rulemaking and putting an 18 exception into the rule for polls, but that's not what 19 you're saying? 20 MR. SVOBODA: No, Commissioner. I believe the 21

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Commission can safely interpret its current rules not to reach these types of communications with the disclaimer.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: And were we to do so, would that be consistent with what we did in the Vitter case?

MR. SVOBODA: I believe it would be consistent with half of what you did in the Vitter case. Again, I think the Commission got it half right in Vitter and half wrong. I think the Commission could credibly find that the 400,000 advocacy calls required a disclaimer. I think the Commission was on far shakier ground with respect to the 90,000 ID's. But, of course, that brings us to the role of the MUR in guiding future enforcement and the MUR itself has no precedential value. I mean, one can wonder whether Mr. Vitter, other than in the circumstances he faced at the time, would have settled that matter on those terms. I suspect he probably wasn't willing to be sued in court in Louisiana at that time over this matter, but that's something that we can't know and that's exactly why a MUR is not -- doesn't have presidential value for the rest of us.

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COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: A fair point. So you

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think we can cover -- we can require disclaimers on some telephone communications?

MR. SVOBODA: I think there is an argument that you can. I think, as the Chairman perhaps indicated in his questions and certainly in the comments that were filed in the rulemaking in 2002, there is a serious question under statutory interpretation whether you can. And we argue that forthrightly in our brief. I mean Congress -- one can only assume that Congress left out telephone bank in 441d for a reason and the Commission needs to consider carefully what that reason was before applying that statute in enforcement to phone calls.

But I don't think the Commission needs to decide that in order to decide this case. I think the Commission can decide this case on narrower grounds, if it prefers, on the simple conclusion that a bona fide poll is not a form of advertising.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: And how do we decide what a bona fide poll is? Do we need some kind of standards? Do we, you know, just go on your affidavit, which is very helpful, for Mr. Quinlan and say, well, you know, that looks

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like a poll? I mean we sort of -- there's been a historical
-- I guess it's varied from one Commission to another, but
some Commissioners have shied away from an I-know-it-when-Isee-it standard, so how do we know what a bona fide poll is
and what a bona fide poll isn't?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, it's something that I think is obvious to those in the political community. Just from the face of -- and we list out the sorts of characteristics that it's going to have: A sample size that numbers in the hundreds and not in the tens of thousands; a scientifically designed questionnaire that, among other things, collects demographic information; the aggregation of data for purposes of generating analysis that is used to inform strategic decision-making; the existence of top lines; the existence of cross tabs, all of these are what political professionals recognize as a poll. When I have a client who calls me and says, "I have a poll that I want to share with another organization, you know, how do I value that?" I know exactly what they're talking about. They're talking about that. They're talking about data that's being aggregated and collected for strategic purposes and here, in fact, the

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Commission's written an entire section of the regulations about polls.

The Commission has an extensive history where it seems to know what they are and what they do and how you break down the question results and survey results to gauge the amount to be allocated as a contribution. So the Commission's got experience with this subspecies of communications. It knows what it is and it can recognize it for what it is in this matter. And I think if you looked at the polls in this matter, would see immediately what they are.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: And to the extent that there are unflattering comments about Mr. Thompson in this - in these polls, your argument is that this is really just message testing. You wanted to see whether these lines of argument would resonate?

MR. SVOBODA: Yes. That's exactly right. So, for example, with the October 21 poll and the reference to Osama Bin Laden, I can clearly understand why a campaign would have wanted to test that issue in polling. That might have been the ultimate double-edged sword three years after 9/11.

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So you might very well think that an argument about Osama Bin Laden would work very well with the voters, but you might have voters with very firm memories of what had happened on that day thinking, I don't want to hear about this, this is offensive to me. I'm not going to listen and I'm going to vote against whoever proposes to talk to me about it. That's part of the reason why you don't see 9/11 imagery that much in political advertising, because it's a raw subject, particularly for those of us, you know, who recall that.

So that's totally a reason why they might have tested that before voters at that time. The record doesn't indicate whether the issue was ultimately used or not, but, frankly, I wouldn't have been surprised if it wasn't.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: And a question like -- or a statement, really, like Stan Thompson supported the Republican prescription drug program that was called a big win for the drug industry by the Wall Street Journal. The new program is too confusing, doesn't guarantee lower drug prices and blocked access to safe and affordable drugs from

Canada. You know, it sort of sounds like you're telling somebody something, you're not asking them.

MR. SVOBODA: Well, it may seem that way, but with knowledge of how a poll is composed and distributed, you can see why it is worded and presented as it is. And here I speak with some benefit as having been a campaign researcher before I practiced law. You'll have a research staff that will do research on an opposing candidate and try to distill it down into points that they think are worthy of political argument. So they may craft a module like that, actually to give to a pollster that they can then test, so they can see does this work or does it not work.

So in the October 12th poll, for example, you might see five or six statements about Stan Thompson and what you'll see at the end of the day is top lines and cross-tabular results showing that some of these arguments worked well and some of them didn't. And the ones that didn't are ones that you probably won't hear about ever again in a campaign.

So sure, it's being crafted and focused as an attack on the opponent, but it's being done to test it's

efficacy in actual political debate and you're going to separate the wheat from the chaff in that process and use what works and discard what doesn't.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: And one other question.

There were three sets of polls that were originally looked at. The first one went to exactly 500 recipients. Do you know why that poll was directed towards precisely 500 people?

MR. SVOBODA: I don't, other than that pollsters tend, from time to time, to craft sample sizes that, you know, come out to round amounts. I mean for the same reason, I assume, that the subsequent sample was 550 and the other one was 800. I don't think it was done -- the record doesn't reflect it was done with any consciousness of the disclaimer requirements.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: That's what I'm trying to get at. That wasn't done as a conscious decision because there was some awareness that something might be triggered if they called one more person, so they stopped at 500?

MR. SVOBODA: The record doesn't reflect that at all.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: Well --1 CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: If I could? 2 MR. SVOBODA: And -- not to hide -- I'm just 3 4 trying to be responsible with the Commission. COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: I understand. 5 MR. SVOBODA: I have no reason to think that that 6 was the case. CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: To get 500 -- to get a sample 8 size of 500 requires more than 500 phone calls. You're not 9 going to get lucky and the first 500 calls are going to be 10 fully completed calls that are going to be statistically 11 significant. You're going to make more than 500 calls, so -12 - it's a sample methodology; right? 13 MR. SVOBODA: That's correct. And the Chairman 14 reminds me of a point I made earlier in the presentation, 15 which is the Commission might well have concluded that that 16 initial poll was still subject to the disclaimer 17 requirements because of the larger number of calls that was 18 needed to get those respondents, so they wouldn't have 19 20 helped themselves at all.

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COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: Okay.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Could I follow up actually with one question that Ms. Weintraub raised. She was reading from the counsel's brief, footnote one. And to put what's in there in context, these weren't calls that just called up and said Stan Thompson supported the Republican prescription drug program that was called a big win. Even that question was probably followed by something -- does that make you less likely to vote for Stan Thompson?

MR. SVOBODA: That's correct. I'd have to look back at the actual questionnaire, but I imagine, from memory, that it reads something like I'm going to read you a number of arguments and I want to know if they make you more likely or less likely to vote against Stan Thompson.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Asking that question, after delivering the bad news about a candidate, is that express advocacy?

MR. SVOBODA: I don't think it is express advocacy, Mr. Chairman, because it's not a communication that is intended to influence the outcome of an election.

In fact, it's rather like what the Commission decided in the Third Millennium advisory opinion where you had a non-profit

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charity that wanted to gauge the efficacy of internet advertising that mentioned on the one hand Gore and on the other hand mentioned Bush. And they tested them with equal numbers of messages for each, they had no intent of influencing the outcome as well, but it was done entirely for scientific research purposes. And the Commission decided on those facts that it was not an expenditure under Section 431, because it itself had no election influencing purpose.

So to answer your question perhaps more precisely, even though the phraseology, would you vote against Stan Thompson if you know thus, might otherwise be express advocacy under 100.22, it is not what the Commission typically regulates as express advocacy and treats as an expenditure under Section 431, because the communication itself is not being distributed for an election-influencing purpose. It is being intended to elicit information so that they can figure out how to influence the election later.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Do we really need to reach the subject of intent though? The question contains magic words, but it's a question. And can a question be express

advocacy if you're merely asking the question?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, I think -- I think that's right. I think that's right. I mean the nature of the communication is going to lead the Commission to a judgment as to whether it's express advocacy or not.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Mr. Petersen?

COMMISSIONER PETERSEN: I just wanted to go back to a point that you raised a little bit earlier about whether or not we should even consider scientific polls to be phone banks. Throughout your brief, you argued at length about why scientific polls shouldn't be considered general public political advertising. I'm looking at page 10 of your brief where you say, a scientific poll is not a form of general public political advertising. It involves unique dialogues with randomly-selected individuals. It's sole purpose is to elicit information, not to disseminate it.

In your opinion, and in advising the Commission, would you advise the Commission to find that scientific polls are not -- not only are they not general public political advertising, but they're not even phone banks under the statute or the regs.

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MR. SVOBODA: I think that's correct. I think I could advise the Commission that way, because phone bank, as Congress wrote it -- again, to implement the soft money spending restrictions -- was intended to get at a particular sort of thing. A party's efforts to communicate with and mobilize its voters for purposes of getting them to do what the party wanted to do. And that's something separate and apart from what a scientific poll does, which is simply to elicit information, even without regard to who the individual is or using their identifiable personal information solely for analysis purposes.

COMMISSIONER PETERSEN: Okay. So, in other words, the definition of phone bank talks about telephone calls in identical or substantially similar nature, the fact that the way a scientific poll is conducted involves a dialogue that may go -- even though there may be a script of questions that are followed, the way in which it proceeds, this unique dialogue that you refer to might actually take it out from under that definition?

MR. SVOBODA: That's correct. A phone bank typically is -- a poll, for example, is going to tend to

have more kind of contingencies, if you will, in terms of what is discussed or isn't discussed with a voter than a party committee's phone bank or a candidate's phone bank will. So, for example, you may have questions that are rotated out for different universes of respondents, you may have questions that aren't asked of certain respondents who fall in certain demographic characteristics, you may have open-ended questions that are asked to the voters where you're seeing open-ended responses. So it's a much more kind of free-flowing dialogue than what the telephone bank regulation for state and local party purposes tends to regulate.

COMMISSIONER PETERSEN: Okay. So it sounds like under this line of thinking -- and you've argued against why we should consider a phone bank if a form of general -- well, you pointed out why a phone bank was not included in 441d, but even if we were to assume that a phone bank should be included under the terms of 441d, it could be argued that even if we were to make that assumption, a scientific poll is not a phone bank and still wouldn't be covered --

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MR. SVOBODA: Right.

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COMMISSIONER PETERSEN: -- under the terms of that provision?

MR. SVOBODA: So, for example, were you to assume that Section 441d could capture phone calls at all, you might then ask is it a telephone bank and thus a public communication? And you might find that it's not a telephone bank because it doesn't fit that criteria under the regulations. You might also ask yourself is it a form of advertising under 110.11 and hence a public communication and you might find that it's not a form of advertising.

COMMISSIONER BAUERLY: Just a brief clarification question. You say that the Commission got it half wrong in Vitter. I just want to make sure I understand. So -- and what you just said is would you consider the second set of calls in Vitter a phone bank?

MR. SVOBODA: I -- for disclaimer purposes,

Commission, no, I would not. I mean, again, they're just
eliciting information. It's just a -- you read the script
of those calls in the Vitter MUR and you honestly really
can't tell, I mean, whether it's being done for survey
research purposes or whether it's being done for ID

collection purposes. The other facts that were available to the Commission, the number of respondents -- they talked with 90,000 people -- I think leads to the conclusion that you were collecting individualized for field purposes, but should it have required a disclaimer

Clearly, I don't think that that set of calls qualified under 110.11. Might they have qualified as telephone page? I can see how they might have, but I think they have as strong an argument as we do that they didn't qualify as advertising.

COMMISSIONER BAUERLY: So for phone bank purposes, the line isn't just whether it's eliciting information rather than conveying information?

MR. SVOBODA: Yes. The way -- when they wrote the definition of telephone bank in 431, what they were trying to do was to capture basically geo-tv-related activity. So I guess to come back to your basic question, I could see how the Commission could reach a judgment that it was a telephone bank under 431, I guess, 22.

But the question is even if it were a telephone bank, should it still have been subject to the disclaimer

requirements? My argument would be that it shouldn't,
because it's still nonetheless classified as advertising.

But fortunately I'm not here to defend or protect -
COMMISSIONER BAUERLY: No. I understand.

MR. SVOBODA: -- Vitter case.

COMMISSIONER BAUERLY: I just want to make sure I understand where your line is. Thank you.

VICE-CHAIRMAN WALTHER: By the way, I want to compliment you on your comments to us. It has been elevated over what we've heard before substantially and thanks for that.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: We're really making him curious.

VICE-CHAIRMAN WALTHER: Yes, well, we still have a ways to go, I guess. We have two polls here and we're asked to carve an exception. I consider the exception so far, one's 500 votes, one's 550 calls, and another one is 800. If you look at the statute, it does appear to me, or certainly in this case, it was found that a call to 500 people or 550 gave sufficient issue information or public polling information to satisfy their needs. And, at some

point, and I'm told by Mr. Elias and a number of others, that by-line is good, because it helps everybody -- gives guidance on the outside community and it gives us an easy way to enforce a statute or regulation without trying to become an expert in every given case as to what's advertising and what's not, say, in this particular case.

So I can see a benefit to some kind of bright-line rule. If you look at it here, in one of the cases, my impression from -- Mr. Quinlan says the 500 or more may be appropriate, but it doesn't say that it had to be over 500 calls in order to make a reliable poll. So the point to me is I'm wondering, just give me something to advance my thinking, maybe a bright line is helpful here to have a poll, or you can have more than 500, if you want to take more than 30 days, and you can have substantially more than that if you do more than 500 and after that, maybe a disclaimer at that particular point makes sense for our bright-line purpose.

And I'm not sure exactly what the intent of Congress was, but it does happen to fit with what I'm reading here is that the true opinion polls don't have to be

very large. I gather if you find the statistically appropriate people to contact, and maybe in some cases it would be more, but if you want to go more than 500, you could do it in 31 days.

So I'm interested in your thought as to line of demarcation. Is there some empirical evidence to show that that bright-line doesn't capture a majority and that bright-line doesn't capture a majority or a substantial majority of truly competent opinion polls?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, Commissioner, we do often favor the Commission drawing bright-lines, it's helpful to all of us, but it has to be not only a bright line, it has to be the right line. And the hand that the Commission's been dealt with, 441d and 110.11, is that by its terms it's restricted only to advertising. So you could argue in this case that that, in fact, is the bright line that the regulation applied only to advertising and the question the Commission has to answer in this MUR is is this a form of advertising? And we would suggest that the record says it's not.

To respond to your question about the sample sizes

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and why committees can't simply make do with a smaller sample size, I think there's three potential problems with that. The first is there's no evidence at all that that's what Congress intended committees to have to do as a consequence of the disclaimer requirements.

The second, as I mentioned earlier to the Chairman and to Commissioner Weintraub, is that to get those 500 responses, you have to have many, many more people in order to do that. So it may be, as a practical matter, impossible to do what you would propose a committee to do.

Thirdly, in a competitive Senate race or in the presidential race, you have a phenomenon called tracking polls, where they will go into the field night after night after night with the same questionnaire so they can see how they're doing from one day to the next. So I guarantee you that Barack Obama and John McCain today are calling 500 or 1,000 voters with the same 10 questions and asking them for responses to those questions. And there's simply no way for a sophisticated campaign to be able to do that over a 30 day period, particularly the 30 days before the election, and comply with the disclaimer requirement under that view.

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The presidential campaigns -- frankly, here I'm veering beyond my expertise, but I would not be at all surprised if they had been tracking since March, because they want to know where they are. So you will have a committee that's always risking noncompliance with the Commission's view of the disclaimer requirement if you're applying that requirement to public polls.

And then last, you know, it goes to the point I made in the beginning of the presentation, which is that -- this is -- we're not asking the Commission here for an exception, we're asking for the Commission to interpret and apply its rules on their face, which apply on their face only to advertising. And if Congress had wanted to extend that requirement to this type of communication, if they had wanted to, they would have done it.

I would be extremely surprised if they would have wanted to at all, because they know very well how these types of communications work and the consequences that something like this would have for the efficacy of those communications.

VICE-CHAIRMAN WALTHER: In this particular case,

I'm a little bit troubled though. When you read the questions that we're proposing, and they seem to me to be -they may get a response, but it's really not the response that they care about, it's really a matter of suggesting, not so subtly, that maybe with any particular background at all, it seems like this particular candidate might -- give us just a sec, sir.

One of them was Stan Thompson opposes additional spending in Afghanistan, which I'm told is false; that, in fact, that support for additional funding has quite often been there, so if you ask him, how did you feel if they said that, when it's a false piece of information, other considerations aside, let's look at this as an advocacy piece. Do you really feel that -- I mean is there some genuine polling expertise that suggests that that's really going to truly elicit some information that would help in the campaign by asking the question that does not apply to the opponent. Likewise, that we'll -- and they used all the words and the fight against terrorism, and so I'm not really sure -- to me it seems to imply that they don't care much about the answer, it's pretty much they want to give that

impact that perhaps relates to this particular gentleman when there's probably not, from what we read, a likelihood that that's so.

And then on another one -- oh, the idea of pointing out the record of the opponent as being an advocate of a campaign against big tobacco and then his firm representing that seems to suggest that perhaps the opponent is a hypocrite when I'm not sure how that really resonates in terms of campaign strategy other than conveying a message.

So how are we as a Commission going to sit here and look at every one of these from here on out and try to discern with any kind of finite or definitive guidance what is and what's not going to fit in a situation like this.

And I think we're going to find ourselves in kind of a metaphysical discussion a lot of times trying to figure out what's fair, and people in the regulated community are going to have a hard time figuring out what we're going to do.

That's my concern.

MR. SVOBODA: Well, Commissioner, I think you can look to the character of the communication to reach a

judgment about whether it qualifies as advertising or not. And this is where Al Quinlan's affidavit, I think, is helpful. He makes the point in the affidavit and here I'm elaborating on it a bit. If I had wanted to communicate to voters in Iowa that Stan Thompson didn't want to fund the search for Osama Bin Laden, I wouldn't do it through a poll distributed to 800 people for which I'm paying \$10,000.00. I'd do it with a robo-call being sent to 80,000 people, lasting a minute, for which I would pay \$10,000.00, if not less.

So one of the points that Mr. Quinlan makes is that this medium of communication, this type of communication is not one that by its nature lends itself to the efficient distribution of political information. And so we can look to the character of the communication to reach a judgment as to whether it's advertising or not. Now, if somebody had sent a robo-call to 80,000 Iowans saying Stan Thompson is a hypocrite because he represented the big tobacco companies, then the Commission might very well reach a judgment that that is a form of advertising and that ought to be subject to the disclaimer requirement, but that's not

this case. That's not this type of communication.

VICE-CHAIRMAN WALTHER: One more quick question.

Do you have any idea for Congress' intent when they used the number 500, where that came from? Because my impression, just really without looking at the Congressional intent for that purpose, is they pick a number that figures, well, if political committees are going to contact more than 500 people, it must be some kind of a political message and for that reason we want to make sure there's a disclaimer involved. I mean there may be a bright-line that was suggested and was adopted, but do you know where 500 came from?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, 500 came from the definition of public communication or, more specifically, the definition of telephone bank, which was incorporated into the definition of public communication for purposes of soft money fundraising and spending restrictions. So what Congress was trying to do there and was doing it with no consciousness of the disclaimer requirement -- what Congress was trying to do there was to make sure that state parties couldn't spend soft money to support federal candidates by,

you know, communicating with a large pocket of voters at once. And I don't know how they came to an exact number 500 when they crafted the definition of telephone bank or crafted the definition of public communication. I assume that Congress thought that it was a useful proxy to capture the extent of communications that would have an election-influencing purpose.

And I've heard others argue, you know, in rulemakings over other similar issues that perhaps, you know, larger numbers are more appropriate for those sorts of judgments, but that's a judgment Congress made. But it's important to know that that's a judgment that Congress made for the FEA restriction, they did not make it with any consciousness of the disclaimer requirement. They imagined the disclaimer requirement to apply to advertising.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: You don't know if in the franked- mail magic number how many pieces of mail you need approval?

MR. SVOBODA: It may have been 500.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Which to me infers that that's a number more to what kind of money you're going to use and

what kind of review you may need, and it's a number that Congress had used in another context as to what required special treatment, which is consistent with the argument that it's a -- the definitional section is the hard money versus soft money distinction, not the disclaimer distinction.

MR. SVOBODA: Correct.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: It always struck me that that was just a number they grabbed from someplace they already had. Ms. Hunter I think had some questions? Vice-chair?

COMMISSIONER HUNTER: Thank you. Thank you. Having run a couple of phone banks and having participated in, I agree with you that this activity was not a phone bank and I also agree that Congress would have added phone bank into the disclaimer section had they wanted to. They certainly know what phone banks are and what polls are and they would have added it.

My question is going back to some of their procedural issues that the Chairman brought up at the beginning of the hearing and one question. I have is when you sent your brief. I think you called it response to the

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"Reason to Believe" finding in MUR 5835 originally on
    February 12, 2008. And you said the next time you received
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    anything from the Commission was on July 1, 2008, which I
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    think was my first day here. Is that correct?
              MR. SVOBODA: That's correct.
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              COMMISSIONER HUNTER:
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              MR. SVOBODA:
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COMMISSIONER HUNTER: So as a general matter, you believe that the general counsel believes that when there's a finding of "Reason to Believe", as a legal matter, that's sort of the end of the story? And you have to agree or disagree with that? That's not the way I understood it. I thought that "Reason to Believe" was just a "Reason to Believe" and that it was possible that there wasn't a finding, because that's the way I understood "Reason to Believe" to be.

MR. SVOBODA: Well, first, I think the consistent position of the general counsel's office throughout the matter has been that my client violated the law. And so I -- so that, I think, has been their perspective throughout

the briefing. One thing that I know from a practitioner's perspective, has happened, you know, more frequently in recent years with the Commission is to reach a finding of "Reason to Believe" and very quickly offer pre-probable cause conciliation as a way to resolve the matter so as to avoid the need for further litigation. That way the general counsel is able to obtain an admission that a respondent violated the law, is able to obtain a penalty and the Commission is able to dispose of the matter efficiently. That was something that was not, however, going to be useful to our clients in this matter, at least in terms of admitting a violation or paying a penalty, because it remains our position that we didn't violate the law.

COMMISSIONER HUNTER: Okay. Thank you. And in the conversation that you had with the general counsel's office, did they discuss with you the theories that you presented here today?

MR. SVOBODA: We did discuss them. I think -- in one sense I would prefer to let them speak for themselves, but I think from the papers it's clear that their position is that because it was 500 phone calls -- because it was

more than 500 phone calls over a 30-day period, it was a telephone bank. Because it was a telephone bank, it was a public communication because a public -- it was a public communication, it required a disclaimer under 110.11 and that decides the legal question. And so that's the way I read their papers and I think that fairly reflects their position.

It did become clear to me in our back and forth with OGC that the purpose of the communication and the nature of the call did not seem relevant to the legal analysis.

COMMISSIONER HUNTER: Okay. Thank you. And you did -- obviously you received a copy of the general counsel's brief, which is a response to your memorandum of the DCCC in response to the "Reason to Believe", and in that they reiterate their legal position from the original factual legal analysis. I believe it's the same, with the exception of they add a footnote to the Vitter MUR. But it's the same legal analysis and it doesn't get into the level of detail that yours does. But you're right, they are steadfast in their conclusion that your client violated

441d. But my question -- when you said that MURs have no precedential value, that -- I don't think I've ever heard anybody say that here and I just wanted to sort of hear your thoughts on that. And, also, the Vitter MUR is included in the general counsel's brief here, so is that -- that's your understanding in the regulated community that MURs don't have any precedential value?

MR. SVOBODA: That's correct. The Commission has been very forthright in other matters saying that the sole avenue to say what the law is is through rulemaking. That's what the Commission said, for example, in 1999, when it was taking up the audits of Senator Dole and President Clinton. And so rulemaking is the sole means that the Commission has in order to impose new norms on the regulated community.

What a MUR reflects is how the Commission and the respondents at the end of the day chose to apply the law to a particular set of facts. And at the end of the day, when you have a conciliation agreement, it is something that the Commission has authorized the general counsel to propose, that the respondents have agreed to after typically some negotiation, and that the Commission has agreed to adopt.

But just because a respondent in a one case chose to accept and not contest a characterization of the law, does not bar someone else later from challenging that same interpretation of the law. For example, I think if Mr. Vitter had chosen to litigate rather than settle with the Commission in his matter, I'm not sure it might not have turned out differently.

COMMISSIONER HUNTER: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: What's the significance of MURs, though, where there's a finding that's beneficial to a respondent? The Commission either finds no "Reason to Believe" or fines RTB with no further action. It may not be precedent in the judicial sense, but under whether it's APA or due process or fundamental fairness or whatever sort of other arguments you want to make, do those sorts of cases have any significance? And if so, does that apply here? Are there any other cases where this may have been raised and the Commission may have not taken action that would be something -- that may be persuasive, if not precedential.

MR. SVOBODA: Well, they do. I mean the Commission under the APA is bound, I mean, to act, you know,

with process of recent decision-making and not to act arbitrarily and capriciously. And if the Commission did that, for example, by choosing not to enforce under one theory in one instance and then choosing to enforce against an identical set of facts, you know, in the reconcilable theory, that could be arbitrary and capricious conduct by the agency.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Do you have any sense -- do others outside the building share your view of whether or not polls need disclaimers? And, if so, any sense that your client feels like they're being singled out as the unlucky test case?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, I don't know that the facts would support that my client has been singled out because of who they are, but I do believe that it is very, very uncommon for political committees to include disclaimers on their research polls. And one of my predictions, frankly, is that if the Commission finds probable cause in this matter, your enforcement business is going to go up substantially. Because there will be a lot of people who will have violated this interpretation of the regulation.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: The regulation's been on the 1 book since 2002? 2 MR. SVOBODA: Correct. 3 CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: It's now 2008. MR. SVOBODA: And the first post-BCRA campaigns 5 began in 2003, so we've got some weeks left here under the 6 statute of limitations. 7 CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: I see. Right. Right. Two 8 final questions just to confirm. In the rule that's at 9 issue in the rulemaking, the notice didn't say that the 10 Commission was considering whether or not polls needed 11 disclaimers. Is my recollection correct on that point? 12 13 MR. SVOBODA: That's correct. It never discussed public opinion polls at all in the 2002 rulemaking. 14 CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: But then the final rule, now in 15 2008, purports to include something that was not in the 16 notice, Cover something that was not in the notice. 17 MR. SVOBODA: That would be true if, indeed, the 18 rule actually purported to do that. What the Commission --19 CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Hence my reference to the 20 calendar year. Now in 2008, that rule now reaches conduct 21

that was not in the notice, didn't appear to be in the rule, arguably, at the time the rule was promulgated and now we are here three, four, five, six years later. Now, all of a sudden, oh, polls may be covered.

MR. SVOBODA: Well, that's correct. And the regulated community is entitled, as the Commission knows well from the Shay's litigation, to some specific notice of what the Commission is actually proposing to do in the rulemaking. The absence of that notice can subvert the Commission's ability to enforce that sort of aggressive interpretation later and make it stand in court. It begs the question of whether the Commission, even if it wanted to apply 441d to a bona fide poll, could still do that. But the fact of the matter is the absence of notice and comment in this instance is itself a significant barrier to taking that position.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: If your client -- if the

Commission found probable cause and if your client did not
want to conciliate and if the Commission decided to go to
court, your client's in Washington, D.C., therefore the
district of D.C. and the D.C. Circuit would be -- the court

-- essentially the Shay's appellant court would be the governing court with respect to your client; correct?

MR. SVOBODA: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Final question, from me anyway.

Any First Amendment concerns on this that -- or other constitutional issues? It seems like we have a reg that some say may reach this conduct. Is there any sort of guidance you can give us on whether or not we have to read a reg to its extreme? Or is there some sort of constitutional limits at how we read our regs?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, there are First Amendment concerns and they apply generally to the subject of disclaimers, as we know from the McIntyre case, as we know from the Public Citizen case. Whenever you impose a disclaimer on a communication, you are forcing someone to say something that they don't want to say and that imposes First Amendment concerns. And the courts upheld -- the Supreme Court in McIntyre and the 11th Circuit in Public Citizen -- have held that the Commission or like agencies can do that, but only when its supported by an overriding state -- by an overriding governmental interest. And that

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interest is just not present here. It's not like any of the interests that were laid out in Public Citizen. The issue - the interest, for example, of helping the electorate judge the content of campaign advertising, protecting against corruption, none of those interests are satisfied here.

And there's also a First Amendment consequence that's unique here and that perhaps goes beyond what the disclaimer cases normally would talk about, which is that you're talking about political organizations that are seeking to elicit information from voters to guide their strategic decision-making. We can argue among ourselves whether polling is a good or evil in the political world, but the fact of the matter is it's a fact of life in the political world and if the Commission were to embrace an interpretation that was to make public opinion polling difficult, if not impossible, in the political world, it would have grave consequences on the ability of candidates and committees to elicit information and develop their messages and present them most effectively to the voters. And that, itself, I think is a First Amendment concern that surpasses even those raised by the anonymous speech case in

McIntyre or by the disclaimer case in Public Citizen.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: McIntyre wasn't a disclaimer case; right? There was some advocacy involved and it looks like a local ballot issue or something.

MR. SVOBODA: Correct. It was about whether -- it was whether, basically, anonymous speech could be permitted in that election.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Ms. Weintraub?

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of follow-up questions. First, on precedent. I completely get your point that, you know, we shouldn't hold it against you that David Vitter decided for perhaps unrelated reasons not to fight to the utmost on this precise issues and I think that's a perfectly fair point, but to say that the MURs have no precedential value is perhaps an overstatement. I mean surely when -- I know this is true. Surely when your clients come to you and say, am I going to get in trouble for doing this, one of the things you do, other than just looking at the statute and the regulation, is to look at prior MURs, to see what has the Commission done in the past in similar circumstances. And you feel,

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you know, not 100 percent certainty, but perhaps some -there's some predictive power from what we've done in the
past that perhaps the Commission will act similarly in the
future; isn't that right?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, I think that's correct. And perhaps a better way to put my point is that MURs themselves do not establish binding norms on the regulated community that didn't exist before. So if we all lived in a world, until last year, where public opinion polls didn't have to have disclaimers or pure ID calls didn't have to have disclaimers, but all of a sudden the Commission decrees in the Vitter MUR that they do and waves the Vitter MUR as the authority for why polls have to have disclaimers, then that's a problem under the Commission's rules and it's a problem under the APA. Because the Commission is supposed to reach those sorts of judgments through a process of rulemaking.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: And that's a perfectly fair point, but, although, it's also true that the courts have endorsed in various circumstances the Commission proceeding on a case-by-case basis and developing the law,

actually, through MURs. You know, it did in the political committee when we were challenged for not issuing a rule on political committees, the court said it's a fair choice or that it's a legal and acceptable choice for the Commission to make, to say, well, we're just going to develop this as we go. And so there's -- you know, it's in this sort of -- I'm not saying that it's -- you're locked in. I'm not saying that -- you know, I think that your point has some merit, but it's not -- we're sort of a little bit in a gray area.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Isn't it true thought that once the Commission decides to go down the rulemaking path, that is the rule system? I mean an agency can decide to do it on a case-by-case basis. Courts have said that's okay. But you can't go to rulemaking, have a rule, and say now we're gong to go case-by-case. Doesn't the APA sort of force you to take the fork in the road much sooner?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, that's correct. And what -in fact, what the Commission is -- you know, here it's not a
question of the Commission trying to reach a judgment of how
a statute or regulation effects a particular discreet,

unusual set of facts, as may be the case, for example, in the political committee context, or, as may be the case, for example, in the corporate facilitation context, where you may have different sorts of conduct that may fall under the ambit of a fairly broad rule.

Here the Commission is being asked to take something that every political committee, ever major political committee does everyday and is about to tell them, you now have to do it differently. And that's the sort of thing that needs to be done through rulemaking.

commissioner weintraub: I get that. I totally get that. Second point. You seemed to say before in response to the vice-chairman's questions that if one were to take some of the statements that were in these polls in isolation, the Afghanistan statement, for example, and send that sentence and that sentence alone to 10,000 phone numbers, that that would be a -- that could require a disclaimer. That would be something different in kind than what happened here. Am I hearing you correctly on that?

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: Is there some magic

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MR. SVOBODA: Correct.

number -- I mean, you know, I laughed when the Chairman asked before about franking rules, because I strongly suspected that he knew the answer to his own question, but, you know, the Congress has picked 500 --

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: That's usually the case.

commissioner weintraus: Congress has picked 500 in other contexts, but is there some number that would make sense, that one would say, well, if they send that many phone calls, whether they do it by robo-call or they've got an army of volunteers out there dialing numbers, that in and of itself is evidence that what we're looking at is a push poll or an attempt to influence people's votes and not a bona fide opinion poll?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, there's -- some of the disclaimer regulation that's now before Congress actually tries to do that. They chose numbers that are well north of the 500 that's in the Commission's definition of telephone bank now to try to weed out, if you will, bona fide polls from other types of polls and I'm at a loss to recall exactly what that number is. I think it's somewhere between one and 2,000 completed calls.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: Well, the Push Poll Disclosure Act of 2007 that you allude to in your very informative memo says 1,200.

MR. SVOBODA: Correct. But --

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: So is there a real legal distinction though between 800 and 1,200?

MR. SVOBODA: I think the way I would recommend the Commission to approach -- the issue we're trying to get across is that the character of the communication matters and that numbers are a way of helping assess the character of communication, but it's not the only way of assessing the character of communication. Because just because it goes to 501 people, it doesn't mean it's advertising. And so numbers can be a proxy for that and, again, to take it at a 50,000 foot level, that's perhaps where the 800 calls on the October 21 poll are different in kind from the 490,000 calls in the Vitter MUR. I mean they're different because this speaks much more clearly a scientific research purpose, but the numbers are a level -- a rough lever -- to get at the character of the communication.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: And we could recognize

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that difference without figuring out here what the magic number is that puts you over the edge?

MR. SVOBODA: That's correct.

COMMISSION WEINTRAUB: Now, I just want to clarify in my own mind and to give you a chance, if I'm not getting this right, to elaborate on this. The legal argument that the regulations do not cover this activity and the way I would parse that is, you know, we've got 110.11 that says, the following communications must include disclaimers, one, all public communications as defined in 11 CFR 100.26 made by a political committee. Then you flip back to 100.26 and a public communication means a communication by means of any broadcast cable or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or a telephone bank to the general public or any other form of general public political advertising. And as we learned in the Internet context, that's not an exclusive -- the list and the statute is not an exclusive list, that any other form of general public political advertising must include something other than what's in that list. That's what the courts said when they rejected our -- the Commission's

attempt to totally exclude the Internet.

So the argument, I assume, would be that by using that phrase at the end, or any other form of general public political advertising, that that somehow modifies everything that came before it. So even if something were a broadcast cable, satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, if it were not a form of general public political advertising, it wouldn't be covered; is that the argument? Or is there more to it or less to it? Or am I entirely getting it wrong?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, that's it. And I think there's a little more to it, too. If you follow the causal chain -- and I think you lay out very neatly what I take the general counsel's chain to be, which is it was sent to more than 500 people, ergo it's a telephone bank, ergo it's a public communication, ergo it's covered by 110.11, the question is when you inspect that causal chain, you know, where are the weak links? And I think there are two weak links here. The first is what you identify, which is that to be a public communication for 431.22 purposes, but

definitely for 441d purposes, it has to be a form of general public political advertising. It has to be advertising.

The character of the communication matters.

'So I think that's the first weak link in the chain, which is to assume just out of the box that because these polls were conducted by phone and conducted to more than 500 people, that they were a form of advertising. The facts clearly indicate that they're not.

The second weak link in the chain, I think, is the characterization of the polls as a telephone bank. Because, again, to get back to what we talked about earlier, telephone bank in the eyes of Congress can fairly be read to capture a specific sort of communication and not this sort of communication, something that's used to mobilize voters, something that's used to communicate individually with voters and not this type of communication.

So these are the weak links, I think, in that analysis and I would caution the Commission against just following it blindly to where it seems to lead, because you have to dwell on each of these terms and understand what they really mean and what Congress meant them to mean in

order to get to the destination at the end of the road,
while seeing that where you're asked to go at the end of the
road is somewhere where no one expected to go.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: So it's neither advertising nor a phone bank?

MR. SVOBODA: Correct.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: Okay.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: A hypothetical. Let's say
election night Chairman Van Hollen decides to call every
democratic candidate for the U.S. House and then places a
separate call to every campaign manager and says the same
thing every time: hey, I appreciate your running. You ran a
good race. I just want to say hello and anything you need
from me, you know, you'll always have a friend in
Washington. Thank you. Same script, more than 500 calls.
Is that a telephone bank that requires a disclaimer?
MR. SVOBODA: Well, I don't think it requires a
disclaimer, because it's clearly not advertising. It's
rather like how we describe the polls in our brief, which is

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mechanical analysis you're being asked to accept would lead

a dialogue between individuals, but I can see how the

ı	you to that conclusion. I mean it goes
2	CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: It goes back to the dog if
3	something has four legs and a tail, it's therefore a dog,
4	even though cats it's the same kind of thing you alluded
5	to in your beginning.
6	MR. SVOBODA: Now, I'm following quite happily
7	your fiction that there's 500 democratic members of
8	Congress. Not even the Constitution
9	CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Please, Counsel, it doesn't I
10	said candidates. I didn't say win or lose.
11	MR. SVOBODA: Indeed.
12	CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Let's not change my
13	hypothetical.
14	MR. SVOBODA: We're being ecumenical, we're
15	calling both sides of the aisle. But assuming for the
16	moment that that's the case
17	CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: All democratic I'm assuming
18	you have somebody on the ballot everywhere, so you have
19	MR. SVOBODA: Sure. We're calling congressmen,
20	senators, state legislators, dog catchers.
21	CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Whoever's on the ballot, you're

just calling to say hello and mechanically that would be more than 500 calls saying the same thing and therefore telephone bank and disclaimer. But that can't -- that's an absurd result.

MR. SVOBODA: Yes. And if you look at the E&J for the federal election activity definitions in 2002, you see that scripted materials count for public communication purposes; that if you're providing a rough template of what people are going to say, even if you anticipate that you're going to vary here or there, it's still a public communication for FEA purposes. So, yes, you follow that mechanical analysis, that's exactly where it leads you.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Mr. Petersen?

COMMISSIONER PETERSEN: I just have one last very simple question. I think the answer you've implied earlier, but I just wanted to ask it directly and that is, did your client in this case actually receive data -- you know, the cross-tabs, the top lines -- as a result of the polls at issue in this matter?

MR. SVOBODA: I don't know the answer to that and I'll you why I don't know. The DCCC paid for these polls as

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a 441AD expenditure in support of Leonard Boswell, so it was a situation where the campaign went to the campaign's own pollster, conducted the poll, and then went to the DCCC and said, here, pay the bill for us. And that's a peculiarity of the 441AD process. It's just when party committees basically pick up the expense on behalf of a candidate as the statute allows them to do.

Now, the facts in this case indicate that the DCCC was aware that they were going to be paying for the polls as they were conducted. The date of the invoices and the fact that they were issued to the DCCC doesn't allow me to say, well, gee, we knew nothing about this, they just came to us with the bills months later and asked us to pay it, but it does raise a wrinkle here that is worth considering, however briefly, which is that all the time people will go to party committees with bills from their pollsters and say, would you pay this for us, this 441d. Here's the poll we did, you know, a month-and-a-half ago, would you pay the bill for us, and the party committees, as they appropriately do under 441d say, sure, we'll pay it for you.

But if they do that, and you adopt this view of

this case and the sample size exceeds five hundred bucks, then each of these are going to result in prima facie violations of the law, because the disclaimer at the outset is never going to correctly say who paid for the poll. It's never going to say that the party committee paid for the poll. It will be incorrect, because at the time they were doing the poll, the campaign was thinking they were paying for it, and indeed at the end of the day they didn't. So it's a catch 22 for political committees and it's one of the many, many traps that this line of reasoning in this case leads you to potentially.

I think that's far from the most significant reason to rule for us and I -- it doesn't really apply to this particular matter, but it's one problem that the Commission will have to deal with if it applies disclaimers to polls in this case.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Any other questions from the Commissioners? If not, our policy statement. General counsel can ask questions of respondent's counsel.

MS. DUNCAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. I think that the questioning has elicited a good

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formulation of the distinction between our legal position and yours, and the difference between our interpretation of the statutes and the regulations as to whether a disclaimer is required for these particular communications and issues, so I won't belabor that point.

I do think that your position suggests that the Commission would have to, for each of these types of communications, determine whether they are a bona fide scientific research poll or general political advertising. And I think there's already been some hints at how making those determinations might be difficult in an environment where we don't really have established standards for doing so.

I think you've suggested that there's some characteristics or the character of the communication can be looked to in terms of the number of people called or the time that's used during the call in order to determine whether we're talking about advertising here or actually a research poll.

I wanted to just focus for a minute on the content aspect of it and to look at the Quinlan affidavit, which

suggests that there can be some negative information imparted in these calls without transforming it into advertisement. Let me just ask if you have a sense of, you know, when you crossed the line there? I mean what percentage can there be of that kind of information before this becomes an advertisement or general political advertising requiring a disclaimer versus a scientific research poll, because I think under your approach those are the kinds of questions the Commission would have to answer, assuming now that the -- as you call it -- the character of the communication, the number of people polled, and the time spent on the phone doesn't give you that answer clearly, that you really are having to look at the content of the call.

MR. SVOBODA: Right. Well, my first observation on that is that the Commission in other sections of the rules knows or at least claims to know what a poll is.

Under 106.4, for example, it recognizes a species of data that is allocated among different committees and allocated on its expenses among candidates -- and it did that after extensive rulemaking, so the Commission has been able in the

past to distinguish between survey research polls and distinguish between other forms of advertising. It's already done so in 106.4 and this is a subject where I think the Commission can appropriately rely on its expertise and the campaign finance laws and in the practices of elections. I mean, for example, if you go to the file in this case and look at these questionnaires, you can tell that they're polls. I mean I hate to sound like Potter Stewart saying I know it when I see it, but you look at it and you know what they are. And if you took it to a political operative, they'd know what it is and they'd know the difference between it and the advocacy calls in the Vitter MUR. They would just know that off the top of their head.

So with that as background, then the question becomes to what extent can a candidate poll positively, poll negatively, to what extent do they need to be ecumenical in talking about the good things about themselves and the bad things about their opponent. And I don't think the rules require them to have any sense of balance in that, other than what is useful for them in developing their data strategically.

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You might have a candidate, as was the case in these polls, who wish solely in these polls to test negatives against their opponents, because at that moment in that campaign that's what they need to do. You know, Leonard Boswell presumably is finding himself in a competitive race in October of 2004 and he's asking himself, you know, how do I beat this guy? What are the arguments that are going to resonate against this guy? He may be asking himself -- I haven't had to go negative for the first 22 months of this campaign, but now it's October, I'm not doing as well as I would prefer and/or I may be doing fine, but I may fear that it goes south later, so how do I make sure that I'm ready?

And at that moment, he may want to test negatives against his opponent. And to require him, at that point, to test the positives on himself, which he may have already done previously and amply -- or he may feel that he has a good handle on, is something that the regulations shouldn't require him to do.

You know, another point to make in response to this is -- I mean this is kind of, I guess, the classic case

of hard cases make good laws, because you could imagine the reverse here. You can imagine Leonard Boswell doing a poll where he's testing the negatives on himself. You know, I'm going to ask you five things about Leonard Boswell and I want to know if it makes you more or less likely to vote for him. You know, he voted for the largest tax increase in history, he fails to be kind to small animals in the street, you know, whatever it is that his pollsters have decided is selling in that election, and do you want to have that communication -- have a disclaimer at the end saying Paid for by Boswell for Congress.

I mean imagine, for example, if Obama or McCain were doing that in their own polls at this time of the campaign. Not only would it give an immense untoward strategic advantage to the other side, which would know exactly, you know, what the other candidate is thinking about themselves and perhaps what their blind spots are and where you can exploit them, but it's also -- it also exposes them, frankly, to embarrassment in the press and the public discourse. They want to know how the facts about themselves are gong to play with particular voters, but they're not

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eager to do that, you know, advertising that it's themselves that are doing it.

So to sum up, I think, A, the character of the communication should, based on past rules, past experience, be recognizable to the Commissions. I don't think that it should require the sort of anguished contextual judgments that I think some might fear, but also I think the candidates need, as a First Amendment right as much as anything else, to have flexibility in how they're crafting their own polls to determine what they need to learn about and what they don't need to learn about in their own campaigns.

MS. DUNCAN: Well, I can imagine a situation where the testing of negatives can happen with respect to the opponent, not with respect to the person financing or doing the calls and that that could have the effect or the consequence of persuading voters or influencing the outcome of the election, maybe not intended, but it would have the consequence.

Do you have a view as to whether that kind of situation takes it then out of how you would define a bona

fide scientific research poll and put it into then the general advertising category?

MR. SVOBODA: I think what Al Quinlan would tell you from his affidavit is that the length of the questionnaire, the nature of the questionnaire, the total number of respondents, the total length of time it takes to create the survey, that all of those are bellwhethers as to whether you have an intent or an effect of influencing voter opinions about a candidate. I think he would tell you that because you're dealing with questionnaires that seek demographic information that are generating cross-tabular results that are being designed for survey research purposes that take 10 minutes to at least -- sometimes many times more than that to distribute -- that those are ample indications of a non-election influencing purpose. At least that discrete communication that you're trying to influence voter activity.

MS. DUNCAN: So you'd have to rely on the other factors there?

MR. SVOBODA: Correct.

MS. DUNCAN: Let me just ask one more question

about another one of these criteria that Mr. Quinlan offers as one that distinguishes scientific research polls from general political advertising and that is that the purpose of the data is to effect later strategic decision-making.

Let me just ask about that in the context of this particular matter. Is it your position that, in fact, these communications did affect later strategic decision-making?

Particularly in light of the timing of the communications, which is relatively close to the election?

MR. SVOBODA: I think they did, because candidates on the eve of an election need to figure out what they're going to say. If they find out that they're in trouble, they need to know what they can say negatively about their opponent. And so I think there's no question that the poll introduced information that was useful to the campaign in reaching those judgments, in terms of how effective or how ineffective these particular lines of arguments were. I think particularly in the case of the first poll, which tested multiple negatives, I think it provided the opportunity to distinguish which of those might be effective lines of political argument and which were less so.

MS. DUNCAN: Are you speaking generally now or 1 that specifically in this matter there was strategic 2 decision-making based on the results of those calls? 3 MR. SVOBODA: I think in this matter there was strategic decision-making that was based on these calls. 5 MS. DUNCAN: Okay. That's very helpful. 6 MR. SVOBODA: That was --7 MS. DUNCAN: I'm sorry. Go ahead. 8 MR. SVOBODA: I'm sorry. That was the purpose of 9 doing it. 10 MS. DUNCAN: All right. Thank you. 11 CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Mr. Vice-chair? 12 VICE-CHAIRMAN WALTHER: Was there particular 13 written instructions given to the polling entity to seek 14 what information you were trying to elicit and then it was 15 left up to them to figure out what kind of questions to ask? 16 How does that work in a case like this where -- I'm having a 17 hard time with some of the questions that were asked, 18 because you can see as to how much scientific evidence is 19 really said to being drawn by those. But in a given case --20 say in this particular case, what are the specific 21

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instructions that were given to elicit, say, we want you to help us find out what negatives would be effective against this candidate? Legitimate negatives.

MR. SVOBODA: No, it's much more prosaic than that. What will happen will be you will have a pollster who is a member of the campaign strategic team. They will help make strategic decision-making with the campaign manager, with the media consultant, with the general consultant. The pollster will draft a questionnaire based on, among other things, on their own observations of the race, input that they received from the campaign manager, in particular, with respect to the questions that trouble you, Commissioner, with input that they've received from their research director. So the pollster, who typically is trained in developing these sorts of questionnaires and eliciting data with integrity, where you can rely on the results, will draft the questionnaire, and then the questionnaire will be made available to what's called a call center. In this case, it was Quest, which was located in Canada. There was one other call center, I think it was Opinion Dynamics. the call center will hire people who are trained --

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basically, like trained phone interviewers who will then call the voters and read strictly from the questionnaires.

They'll be given clear instructions not to deviate from the questionnaires.

These people are -- I mean not to be mean or dehumanizing, but they're like robots. I mean they are delivering the messages that the pollsters want them to convey in as dispassionate a way as possible, so as not to bias or interfere with the integrity of the results. And then the data that's collected by the call center will be provided back to the pollster, who will distill it into what are called top-lines, which is -- you know, each question, the percentage of people who answered each way, and then cross-tabular results so that you can see, based on demographic characteristics, or people who answered on this or that question, how they answered on a particular question. And the pollster will use that as the basis to provide advice to the campaign. What they may do -- I don't believe they did it in this instance, but what will often be the case is they'll draft a strategic memo to the campaign saying here's how I interpret the poll. We have deduced

that Svoboda has deep trouble, you know, winning votes from women between the ages of 40 and 65, he needs to talk more about Social Security, needs to talk more about Medicare, you know, and here are things that you can do.

So the pollster will distill this into actionable strategic advice for the campaign.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: What happens when somebody asks, as I always do if I get a call -- a robo-call -- who is calling me? Why is this call being directed to me? I'm always inquisitive about that. And that helps me decide whether I want to continue or not, I'll be honest with you. So what happens then when somebody asks you? Do you disqualify those that ask you or just say I'm sorry, I'm not allowed to tell you? Or what?

MR. SVOBODA: No. In fact, Al Quinlan talks about that in the affidavit. Typically, the call center will either identify themselves or they'll provide, you know, a business name related to the transaction. They won't disclose who the end client is, whether it was, for example, Anzalone List Research or whether it was the Boswell campaign, precisely because that information might buy us

the results.

So, for example, if I were looking at him in 2004 and I got, you know -- well, take an example, I guess, in 2004 saying I'm calling from the Mellman Group, will you have time for a 20-minute survey, you know, about the presidential race? Well, I know exactly who they're calling on behalf of, I know they're calling about John Kerry and they're taking a poll for John Kerry. And so if they give me that information, then I'll post that to Free Republic saying, oh, I got the Kerry poll and here's exactly what they asked me. So they'll be nondescript about it. They won't typically lie about it, but they'll be nondescript about it and basically give the name only of the call center.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Ms. Weintraub, you're not going to ask about that Canadian outsourcing, are you?

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: I'm not. No. I realize that when I was taking Mr. Svoboda through the regs, I should have gone back to one more reg. I just want to make sure that I've got your argument down. Telephone banks, because you said it wasn't a telephone bank. Now, our

regulation defines telephone bank as more than 500 telephone calls of an identical or substantially similar nature within any 30 day period. And there's no reference at all to content. So just so I get it in my head, tell me one more time why wasn't it a telephone bank?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, first off you take the term itself, which meant something to Congress and political professionals and that was being applied to party committees in the field context and you can argue that the term itself was not meant to capture this sort of conduct.

The second is if you look at identical or substantially similar communications and you look at a poll, which is individualized dialogues with respondents where they are all telling you different things, they're all telling you very different things and you're eliciting information from them and aggregating it into a coherent whole, that belies the notion that these are identical or substantially similar communications.

commissioner Weintraub: Okay. Let me interrupt you for one second there, because the regulation goes on to say, for purposes of this section substantially similar

includes communication that includes substantially the same 1 template or language, but vary in nonmaterial respects, such as communications customized by the recipient's name, 3 occupation, or geographic location. MR. SVOBODA: But nonmaterial respects, Commissioner. Everything that these voters are telling us 6 is material. It's the whole reason we're communicating with 7 them. Whether they like Barack Obama or John McCain is 8 material, whether they're a 40 year old woman or a 65 year-9 old man is material. Whether they think that Stan Thompson 10 shouldn't have provided funding to hunt down Osama Bin Laden 11 is material. Everything they're telling us is material and 12 all of these interviews are varying in all of those 13 respects. 14 COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: And that changes the 15 questions? Depending on how you answer one question, you 16 get a different set of questions down the road? 17 MR. SVOBODA: In some instances it can, yes. 18 COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: In these polls? 19 MR. SVOBODA: But it goes to basically -- it goes, 20 I think, to the basic issue about applying telephone bank to 21

this particular context, which is the classic case of putting the square peg in the round hole. It was written to effect parties and candidates delivering messages to voters, saying come to the fish fry for Leonard Boswell on Friday night or vote for Leonard Boswell on November 4 or have you heard about Leonard Boswell's plan for Social Security? It's intended to get at basically these sorts of advertising and mobilization communications. It wasn't crafted to get at these sorts of interviews, which were intended to elicit information from voters.

So you look, for example, at the word -- I think it's "convey" in the regulation -- I mean you're talking about communications that are meant to convey information and these are communications that aren't meant to convey information, they're meant to elicit information.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: Well, actually -- but it doesn't -- there isn't anything in the reg about conveying information, it just says more than 500 telephone calls of an identical or substantially similar nature within any 30 day period. It's not dispostive, because I think you get a better argument on advertising.

MR. SVOBODA: Right.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: I just want to make sure that, you now -- because when I read that it seems to me that certainly one could make the argument that our hands are somewhat tied by that, at least insofar as finding that this was a telephone bank, as defined in our regulation.

And you say it's not, so I want to make sure you have full opportunity to tell me why it's not.

MR. SVOBODA: Let me take another run at this. The Commission's got authority at the end of the day to interpret its own regulations. I mean it takes statutes and it takes rules that it writes and there are times that it has to put meat on the bones, if you will. It says, yes, this is a bare-bones rule and it says this, this, this, and this, but how does it apply in this particular context? At some level what does it mean and what is attempted to cover? So it's not simply an arid, you know, application of particular words to particular conduct. At some level in interpreting and applying the rule you have to take what it was intended to get at and apply it to particular conduct and see, is this what it was meant to cover? And that's

where I think there's a problem with applying the telephone bank regulation to scientific polls, because while the regulation itself doesn't say convey, if you read the regulation and look at it, you see that that's exactly what it's about. It's about trying to get at a type of communication where a political party is communicating information to voters. I mean it's implicit in the language.

So, for example, you know, you look -communications transmitted. They include substantially same
template or language. Why do they say substantially the
same template or language? Because they're trying to
basically get at mass advertising. You know, if it's like,
for example, the episode of The Office where Michael is
trying to get, you know --

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: I've never seen The Office. I should be embarrassed to admit that, but --

MR. SVOBODA: Or somebody who works for a telemarketing firm reading from a script saying would you like to buy prescription drugs. You know this new weightloss drug or something. I mean that's what telephone bank

is intended to get at. Somebody's selling something to someone. It's somebody who is communicating actively with somebody who is listening passively and trying to, you know, get them to do what you want to do.

But a poll is exactly the reverse of that. A poll is where you're communicating with someone and you want to know what they think. You're not trying to influence what they're doing, you're trying to know what they think.

COMMISSIONER WEINTRAUB: That's very helpful.

Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BAUERLY: Can I ask one --

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Sure.

if I'm calling and I say, are you coming to the fish fry for Leonard Boswell? It seems to me that if we are only deciding whether something's a phone bank, whether the question is conveying information versus getting information, there's a lot of instances where I think what you're talking about with phone banks, where it's, you know, where you're getting a message out or you're telling someone about a fish fry, it seems to me there's obviously going to

be a response from that person. So where do we draw the line if there are responses in both instances?

MR. SVOBODA: Well, typically in that case the response is going to be, you know, either one word or three words -- yes, no, or I don't know.

COMMISSIONER BAUERLY: Well, there might be, but

I'm certain there are also lots of people who once they have
someone from the campaign on the phone, might feel free to - they may ask who's calling? They may ask lots of other
questions about issues or things like that, so --

MR. SVOBODA: Okay.

COMMISSIONER BAUERLY: -- I'm just trying to understand where the line is if a response is also possible in these other circumstances?

MR. SVOBODA: I think the basic line is advertising. You know, are you trying to provide people with information that you expect them to act upon? You know, that's what advertising is. That's the dictionary definition. And so telling people, hey, Leonard Boswell is going to be at the fish fry on Friday night, that's advertising. You're telling them that because you want

them to keep that information and you want them to act on it.

But a poll, in contrast, is not advertising.

You're not providing them with information that you are expecting them to act upon, you are eliciting information from them that you act upon. I mean, frankly, most pollsters, as they communicate with respondents in doing the polls, they would actually prefer probably that they forget what they heard from the pollster, precisely so they wouldn't go and post it on the Daily Coast or RedState.org and they can protect the integrity of the data.

So I think that's the fundamental distinction,
Commissioner. It lies in advertising. Are you trying to
give other people information for the purpose of having them
act upon it. And it's of a piece with -- by the way, the
recent telephone bank was written into the statute and it
was for FEC purposes. It was to keep state and local
parties from spending soft money to influence federal
elections. It was to keep them from using soft money to pay
for phone banks to tell people to go and vote for a federal
candidate.

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COMMISSIONER BAUERLY: And so it's the advertising line where you argue that things like voter ID don't fall into this area?

MR. SVOBODA: Correct. Correct.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Anything from the office of staff director?

MR. STOLTZ: Thank you, no.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: We're already over time, so I always like to give you the final word and let you give the old college try. Touché.

MR. SVOBODA: Well, I appreciate the Commission taking the time and asking all the questions that you did.

I think the Commission faces two basic questions: The first is, is this a result that you want to reach? And then second is, if it's not, how do you avoid it?

In terms of whether this is a result you want to reach, clearly, no one in the regulated community has any anticipation that the disclaimer requirements apply to scientific polls. And if the Commission were to hold otherwise, it would completely change the way politics is conducted in a way that people aren't anticipating. It

would make news, and unwelcome news, to those like my clients that are active politically on both sides of the aisle. How does the Commission avoid that outcome? I think the Commission has the flexibility and indeed is required to read its regulations in a way that does not apply to these communications. I think that the Commission can find that 110.11, at bottom, applies only to advertising and that a scientific poll, by its nature, is not a form of advertising.

I think the Commission can also find that 110.11, by its definition, reaches only telephone banks as a form of public communication and can find that this is not a telephone bank. That it was not the sort of thing that Congress wrote the statute -- a statute, by the way, written in a completely different area of the law having nothing to do with disclaimers -- to reach.

How do you find that it's not a telephone bank?

As I was talking about with Commissioner Weintraub, I think you can look, A, at the way in which that term is understood in the political community, and B, you can link it again to the basic concept of advertising. That what Congress was

trying to do with the FEA restrictions was to make clear that you couldn't disseminate information to people spending soft money in ways that would affect the outcome of the election. And that's in stark contrast from what we're talking about here, which is trying to elicit information from people in a neutral way that you can then process and use for your own strategic decision-making.

So those, I think, are the paths that the Commission can follow to reach a proper outcome in this case. And I appreciate the Commission's time and we look forward to providing whatever other information you or the general counsel might require.

CHAIRMAN MCGAHN: Thank you. Anything else for the good of the order? If not, the meeting is hereby adjourned. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m. the hearing was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, PATRICIA A. EDWARDS, the officer before whom the foregoing testimony was taken, do hereby testify that the

testimony that appears in the foregoing transcript was duly recorded by me; that the testimony was taken by me and thereafter reduced to a transcript under my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the testimony given by the witnesses; that I am neither counsel for, nor related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this testimony was taken; and further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

PATRICIA A. EDWARDS